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THE DUTY OF AN EMPLOYER TO BARGAIN IN
POSTCONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
William Seaglet
The employer's duty to bargain also after he has signed a collective bar-
gaining agreement has raised many problems as the scope of collective bar-
gaining has been increasingly expanded. The solution of these problems has
been rendered more difficult, however, by the adoption of the concept of
waiver, and a disinclination to apply the ordinary principles of contract law.
A return to contractualism is championed.
In the law of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations
Act, the problem of what is a mandatory subject of bargaining is not
confined to precontract negotiations. It also may arise after an employer
and a union have entered into a collective bargaining agreement. The only
difference between the two situations is that before a contract has been
entered into the duty of the employer to bargain is determined solely by
reference to the requirements that are contained in section 8(d) of the
statute,1 while after a contract has been entered into the provisions of
the contract itself must also be taken into consideration. Unfortunately,
however, contracts are even less likely than statutes to be clear and
unambiguous, particularly when the contract is a labor agreement, which,
like a statute itself, is designed to regulate the relations of large and
.powerful groups. Many problems are discussed in the negotiations but
the troublesome and vexatious issues are not, for various reasons of
strategy, resolved in explicit and concrete terms. These are the problems
that arise subsequently, as a rule, to plague the contracting parties, and
they have become more acute as the scope of collective bargaining has
been expanded. The expansions being often unanticipated, the problems
multiply, and they have certainly multiplied since the National Labor
t Author of The Quest for Law, Men of Law, Law: The Science of Inefficiency and other
works. Formerly an editor of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, an Assistant Solicitor
of the United States Department of the Interior and a member of its Board of Contract
Appeals, the author is now a Trial Examiner for the National Labor Relations Board. The
views expressed by the author in the present article do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Board.
1 Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.§ 158(d) (1964), provides in pertinent part as follows:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reason-
able times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached
if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided, That ... the duties so
imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any
modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if
such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be re-
opened under the provisions of the contract.
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Relations Board held in Town & Country2 and in the second Fibreboard'
case that the elimination of unit jobs by subcontracting, although for
economic reasons, was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,
for there are few contracts indeed in which the subject of subcontracting
has been expressly covered.
The question of whether an employer is required to bargain with a
contracting union with respect to subject matters discussed in precon-
tract negotiations but not specifically covered in the resulting contract
has involved many difficulties. The attempts to resolve these difficulties
have produced a body of decisions and doctrines especially marked by
obscurities and uncertainties, if not inconsistencies, and by not infrequent
dissents and reversals. 4
THE EARLY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 8(d):
THE "DIscusSION" CONCEPT
To understand the nature of the problem involved, it is necessary to
go back to the period just before the amendment of the original Wagner
Act by the Taft-Hartley Act. It had been held in this period that the
employer's duty to bargain continued even with respect to those matters
as to which he had reached agreement with the contracting union and
which were set forth in the terms of the written contract.5 In one of
these cases collective bargaining was characterized as "a continuing and
developing process." 6 However, the requirement thus judicially estab-
lished was supposed to have been set aside by the provision of the Taft-
Hartley Act, which is now contained in section 8(d) of the act and which
provides that the duty to bargain collectively shall not be construed "as
requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms
and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modifica-
tion is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be
reopened under the provisions of the contract."' 7
In Tidewater Associated Oil Co.,' the Board unanimously held that
2 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962).
3 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
4 It is a considerable time since this subject received extended theoretical discussion. The
first time was in an article published shortly after the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act.
See Cox & Dunlop, "The Duty To Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing
Agreement," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1098 (1950). See also Wollett, "The Duty To Bargain Over
the 'Unwritten' Terms and Conditions of Employment," 36 Texas L. Rev. 863 (1958).
5 See, e.g., NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); NLRB v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693 (1941); NLRB v. High-
land Shoe, Inc., 119 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1941); Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir.
1940).
6 NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., supra note 5, at 267.
7 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). [Emphasis added.]
8 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
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this provision referred only to "terms and conditions which have been
integrated and embodied in writing."' The Board thus interpolated the
word "written" in the phrase "contained in a contract," and held that
the phrase meant that an employer could not, during the life of a con-
tract, decline to discuss a bargainable issue unless it has been made a
part of the agreement itself.
It might be supposed that this doctrine meant that an employer could
be excused from bargaining only about such matters as were expressly
covered by the terms of his written agreement with the contracting union.
The subsequent history of the doctrine was to demonstrate, however,
that in some circumstances an employer could still be excused from bar-
gaining about a particular matter even though it was not covered ex-
pressly by the terms of his written agreement with the contracting union.
In other words, he could justify a unilateral action by claiming a waiver
by the union.
The first step in this direction seems to have been taken in the land-
mark decision in Jacobs Mfg. Co.,10 decided less than two years after
Tidewater. The Board split badly in the Jacobs case, which involved the
question whether the employer had to bargain with the union about
pensions and insurance. Although neither of these matters was mentioned
in the collective-bargaining agreement, a majority of the Board seems
to have subscribed to the doctrine that mere discussion of a bargainable
issue in contract negotiations excused subsequent bargaining concerning
it. Since pensions had not been discussed in the negotiations, but the
insurance program had been discussed and some changes made in it,
the employer was held to have violated the act only in refusing to discuss
pensions. Chairman Herzog sponsored a doctrine, however, that went
beyond mere discussion. He held that before a matter could be said to
have become nonbargainable it must have been not only "fully discussed"
and "consciously explored" but also to have become a subject on which
agreement was reached although outside the written contract. A majority.
of the Board, which included Chairman Herzog, in holding that the
employer and the union were obligated to discuss those bargainable
issues which had not been discussed during negotiations, and which were
in no way treated in the contract, also declared: "And if the parties
originally desire to avoid later discussion with respect to matters not
specifically covered in the terms of an executed contract, they need only
so specify in the terms of the contract itself.""'
9 Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1099 (1949).
10 94 N1L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
11 Id. at 1220. They gave as an example a provision of a recent contract between the
United Automobile Workers of America and General Motors Corporation reading as follows:
1966]
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The most fundamentalist view in the Jacobs case was expressed by
Member Reynolds, who, although he had concurred in the unanimous
decision in the Tidewater case, now announced that, upon reconsideration,
he had been convinced by a study of the legislative history of sec-
tion 8(d) of the act that it imposed "no obligation on either party to a
contract to bargain on any matter during the term of the contract except
as the express provisions of the contract may demand."'
It would seem that a majority of the Board actually held in the Jacobs
case that the mere discussion of a matter in negotiations preceding a
contract is sufficient, without more, to excuse an employer from further
bargaining. In NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co.,'" the Second Circuit, in
enforcing the Board's order, apparently construed the Board's decision
in this way, for, in commenting on the decision of the majority that the
respondent was not bound to bargain concerning the insurance program,
the court expressly declared that "we do not intend to pass upon the
effect, if any, on the duty to bargain, of mere previous discussion of a
subject without putting any terms and conditions as to it into the con-
tract."' 4 However, the Board has never expressly overruled the Jacobs
The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which resulted in this agree-
ment, each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals
with respect to any subject or matter not removed by law from the area of collective
bargaining, and that the understandings and agreements arrived at by the parties after
the exercise of that right and opportunity are set forth in this agreement. Therefore,
the Corporation and the Union, for the life of this agreement, each voluntarily and
unqualifiedly waives the right, and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated,
to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter not specifically referred
to or covered in this agreement, even though such subjects or matter may not have been
within the knowledge or contemplation of either or both of the parties at the time that
they negotiated or signed this agreement.
Id. at 1220 n.13. Clauses of this character will be referred to hereinafter as "coverage"
clauses.
12 Id. at 1231. This conclusion was based on the fact that § 8(d) had its origin in a
definition of collective bargaining contained in § 2(11) of H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.(1947), in which it was declared that it was not to be construed as requiring that either
party "discuss modifications of an agreement except pursuant to the express provisions
therefor," and on the further fact that the House report on the bill stated: "It does not
require bargaining on any matter during the term of a collective bargaining agreement,
except as the express terms of the agreement permit." H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 23 (1947). However, § 8(d), as finally enacted was based on S. 1126 80th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1947), rather than H.R. 3020, which so far as concerns the substance of the provisions,
was by no means identical with the language of § 2(11) of the House Bill. Nevertheless,
in replying to critics of the provision, Senator Taft declared in the Senate that there was
no basis for their contention that § 8(d) would deny to the parties an opportunity for
further collective bargaining, and he explained: "the provision has no such effect. It merely
provides that either party to a contract may refuse to change its terms or to discuss such
a change to take effect during the life thereof without being guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice. Parties may meet and discuss the terms of their contract and may agree to modi-
fications on change of circumstances, but it is not mandatory that they do so." Jacobs
Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1231 (1951). Member Reynolds conceded that "it would be
unrealistic to say that the language of the Section 8(d) proviso is unambiguous," id. at 1229,
but he regarded the legislative history as tending to support his position.
13 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
14 Id. at 684. [Emphasis added.]
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case, either in whole or in part. Indeed, the case has been cited on a
number of recent occasions with evident approval.15
Nevertheless, it would seem that except for its reaffirmation of the
construction of section 8(d) in the Tidewater case, the Jacobs case has
been repudiated insofar as it stresses the importance of mere discussion
itself. It would seem, actually, that the doctrine followed at least by a
majority of the Board since the Jacobs case was decided is not based
upon the view that the mere previous discussion of a subject is sufficient.
THE ADOPTION OF THE WAIVER CONCEPT
The Board now seems to hold not only that a subject matter must have
been fully discussed or consciously explored in precontract negotiations
but also that something else must have happened, although what this is
would seem to be rather difficult to determine, for the Board seems never
to have squarely adopted the view of Chairman Herzog that an oral
agreement must have been reached with respect to the subject matter
under discussion. The doctrine which the Board seems long to have
espoused appears to have been most elaborately expressed in The Press
Co. 6 as follows:
It is well established Board precedent that, although a subject has been dis-
cussed in precontract negotiations and has not been specifically covered in
the resulting contract, the employer violates Section 8(a) (5) of the Act if
during the contract term he refuses to bargain, or takes unilateral action
with respect to the particular subject, unless it can be said from an evalua-
tion of the prior negotiations that the matter was "fully discussed" or "con-
sciously explored" and the union "consciously yielded" or clearly and unmis-
takably waived its interest in the matter.
To hold that, without regard to the nature of the precontract negotiations,
the mere discussion of a subject not specifically covered in the resulting
contract removes the matter from the realm of collective bargaining during
the contract term would be to place a premium (a) upon an employer's
ability to avoid having the subject included in the contract, despite his
knowledge of the union's position that it was a bargainable matter and not
within his unilateral control; and (b) upon the union's ability to have the
subject specifically referred to in the contract by engaging-if necessary-in
a strike.
Adoption of such an inflexible approach to labor relations-which, in
determining an employer's obligations, would look almost exclusively to
whether a particular subject was specifically included in the contract-
would be tantamount to equating a trade agreement to an ordinary private
commercial contract. It would completely disregard the familiar concept of
collective bargaining as a continuing and developing process by which the
15 See, e.g., International Shoe Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (1965); Tucker Steel Corp.,
134 N.L.R.B. 323, 338 (1961); Proctor Mfg. Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1170 n.3 (1961).
16 121 N.L.R.B. 976 (1958).
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relationship between an employer and the representative of his employees is
to be molded. 17 [Emphasis added.]
In this pronouncement the Board has expressed not only the philos-
ophy of collective bargaining which underlies its interpretation of the
present requirement of section 8(d) of the act but has also adumbrated
a methodology for giving effect to this philosophy. So far as the phi-
losophy is concerned, it can hardly be gainsaid that the interpretation
of the effect of collective-bargaining agreements involves far more ex-
plosive issues than are involved in the case of private contracts, and
that it is well always to keep this in mind. Doubtless the specter of the
strike is worse than the nuisance of nonperformance, and affects far more
people, and it is desirable to adopt a philosophy of interpretation that
will minimize the danger of strikes. But it seems obvious that the amend-
ment of section 8(d) by the Taft-Hartley Act was to put some limit on
the free scope of collective bargaining which had prevailed prior to its
enactment, and that the solution of the technical legal problems is not
advanced by continuing to speak of collective bargaining as "a con-
tinuing and developing process" long after this dictum has been invali-
dated, at least in part, by the amendment of the legal provisions that
produced it.
18
As for the methodology, the guidelines provided do not seem to be of
very much help in the solution of concrete problems. Assuming that
mere discussion is not enough, how far must a discussion have gone be-
fore it can be said to have been "full"? It seems to me that actually
protracted discussion or exploration is more likely to betoken a basic
disagreement, and a failure to resolve it. Many a contract has been made,
on the other hand, after what would seem to have been the most casual
discussion.
It also seems to be of little help to be told that an employer is not
free to take unilateral action unless the union "clearly and unmistakably"
waived its interest in the matter. The cases in which the Board has
stated that a waiver will not be lightly inferred and that the evidence
that it has occurred must be "clear and unmistakable" or "clear and
unequivocal" are many indeed, but this merely rationalizes the conclusion
that has been reached after the specific facts have been considered.
Obviously, the evidence cannot really be said to be "clear and un-
17 Id. at 977-79.
18 See text following note 6 suiira. The "familiar concept of collective bargaining as a
continuing and developing process" still makes its appearance in a case as recent as Proctor
Mfg. Co., supra note 15, at 1170. It also appears in Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v.
Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 525 (1949), but, although this case was decided in 1949, two years
after the Taft-Hartley Act, the events that gave rise to the litigation occurred prior thereto.
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mistakable" in cases in which the Board is less than unanimous, 9 and the
dissenters accuse their colleagues of having found an "implied" waiver20
Tm BASIC TRENDS OF DECISION
(1) The "Management Prerogative" Cases
While the general theories of full discussion and clear and unmistakable
evidence of waiver are of little help as guides to decision, the concrete
facts of the decisions themselves do reveal some trends. Almost all the
cases may be divided into two basic classes: (1) those involving unilateral
action by an employer without consulting the union, and (2) those in-
volving the refusal of information requested by the union.
In cases falling in the first class, the concept that seems to possess
the most magic is that of "management prerogative." If an employer can
persuade the Board, or a majority of the Board, that in the course of the
bargaining he insisted on resolving the matter on which he took unilateral
action as a management prerogative, he is likely to prevail, especially if
the collective-bargaining agreement includes an express management
rights clause, or some form of coverage clause or both.2
On the other hand, in what is perhaps the leading case involving the
concept of management prerogative, Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing
Co. 2 -- at least this seems to be the case in which the concept is most
elaborately discussed-the respondent did not prevail when it unilater-
ally increased work loads after it had refused to discuss work loads in the
negotiations. The majority of the Board drew a distinction between the
opposition of an employer to a demand on the merits and his assertion of
a right to take unilateral action as a management prerogative. It pointed
out that "an employer will resist inclusion of a certain provision in a
contract simply because he is opposed to the provision on its merits, and
19 See, e.g., The Berkline Corp., 123 NL.R.B. 685 (1959); Beacon Piece Dyeing & Fin-
ishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958); International News Serv. Div., 113 N.L.R.B. 1067
(1955); Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 NL..R.B. 1214 (1951).
20 As the dissenters said in International News Serv. Div., supra note 19,; at 1075,
"Obviously they would substitute what at best is an implied waiver from silence or ambigu-
ous conduct for the judicially approved doctrine that nothing less than a 'dear and un-
equivocal' waiver will suffice."
21 See Hughes Tool Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 208 (1952), which involved the issue of sub-
contracting. In the previous contract, which contained a management rights clause, decisions
on subcontracting were-mirabile dictu--expressly reserved to the employer. While this
provision was omitted from the current contract, the parties agreed on a clause in which
they declared: "Company shall continue to have all of the rights which it had prior to
the execution of this agreement except such rights as are relinquished herein." Id. at 209.
The Board held: "The union thereby waived any right, it might otherwise have had, to
require the Respondent to bargain concerning subcontracting during the term of the existing
agreement." Ibid. In the Borden Co., 110 NL.R.B. 802 (1954), a coverage clause alone
sufficed to uphold the respondent in discontinuing, unilaterally, Sunday deliveries of its milk
products but it also appeared that in the negotiations the union had demanded a guarantee
that there would be no deviation from 7-day deliveries.
22 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958).
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not because he is seeking the right to act unilaterally on the subject as a
matter of 'management prerogative.' ,23 In the still more recent case of
Proctor Mfg. Co."4 the employer was also held to have violated section
8(a) (5) of the act when after making a contract with the union contain-
ing a management rights clause he, unilaterally, established new pro-
duction quotas and piecework rates. The management rights clause
provided that the employer would not be deprived of his management
rights "unless said interpretation is expressly required by the provisions
of this Agreement."25 The Board felt, however, that "the parties never
came to. grips with the concrete issue of whether the Union could insist
on negotiating changes in specific piecework rates following on changes
in methods of production."26
It would seem to be a reasonable deduction from such cases as Beacon
Piece Dyeing and Proctor that they turn less on the question whether
the subject under consideration was fully discussed than on the nature
of the discussion, the positions taken by the parties, and whether the
union, either by its silence, or by some positive manifestation "acquiesced"
in the employer's position that a particular matter was to be a manage-
ment prerogative. In Beacon Piece Dyeing the Board declared, in what
appears to be an uncompromising rejection of traditional contractual
concepts, that it had never found "a waiver of a bargaining right simply
because a union had abandoned a bargaining demand in return for other
concessions,127 and it may be inferred from NLRB v. Gulf Atl. Ware-
house Co.,28 that the mere fact that a demand was rejected in negotiations
is not enough. There must be, therefore, something additional, and
this would seem to be a determined attempt by the union to effect a
change in a long-maintained position of the employer who has always
treated the subject matter of the union's demand as a management
prerogative justifying unilateral action on his part. The employer's
prerogative is likely to be upheld particularly when the issue has been
sharply focused by the union's presentation in writing of a general clause,
the effect of which, either directly or by necessary implication, would
have altered the employer's practice if he had agreed to accept it. Thus,
in Speidel Corp.,29 the rejection by the employer of a "Maintenance of
23 Id. at 960.
24 131 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1961).
25 Id. at 1168.
26 Id. at 1170. [Emphasis added.)
27 Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 NJ..R.B. 953, 957 (1958).
28 291 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1961).
29 120 N.L.R.B. 733 (1958).
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Privileges" clause proposed by the union, which would have required
the employer to continue the payment of bonuses, which had always been
regarded as voluntary, was held to have established a management
prerogative justifying the employer in paying the bonuses without con-
sulting the union. Thus a proposal which would have nullified manage-
ment rights, and which was not embodied in the final contract, proved
just as efficacious as an express management rights clause in the contract
itself.
(2) The Information Cases
In the second class of cases, involving requests for information,
employers have had comparatively little success in resisting such re-
quests. Freedom of access to information is as basic to the functioning of
industrial as it is to the functioning of political democracy. A union
cannot adequately or successfully police or administer a collective-bar-
gaining agreement or process -grievances if it is denied access to necessary
information, and such access ha's in fact infrequently been denied.
On the technical legal level the right of a union to information is also
on a firmer footing than the right of an employer to take unilateral ac-
tion. Section 8(d) of the act, which has put some limit on the scope of
collective bargaining, was not intended to modify in any way the em-
ployer's obligation to furnish information."0 There is, moreover, a basic
difference between satisfying the right to bargain collectively and the
right to have access to information. Since particular benefits can be
obtained only if they are embodied in a collective-bargaining agreement,
there can be no such thing as an independent statutory right to go on
bargaining about them if they are covered by the contract. Once bargain-
ing has occurred, the statutory duty to bargain about them has been
discharged. There is, however, an independent statutory right to informa-
tion which is not necessarily lost because the union has foreclosed itself
from bargaining about the subject matter by the terms of the contract. As
already indicated, the information may still be needed for the purpose of
contract administration. It is only when the union is demanding informa-
tion for the purpose of bargaining on a nonbargainable subject matter-
nonbargainable because it is foreclosed by the terms of the contract-that
the demand need not be met. In these circumstances no purpose would
be served by requiring the information to be furnished.31
80 See Hugh J. Baker & Co., 112 NL.R.B. 828 (1955).
31 See The Berkline Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 685 (1959); International News Serv. Div., 113
N.L.R.B. 1067 (1955); Avco Mfg. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 729 (1955); Hughes Tool Co., 100
N.L.R.B. 208 (1952).
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THE THEORIES OF DECISION: "BARGAINING AWAY"
Despite the obvious differences between the cases involving unilateral
action and the refusal of information, the concept of waiver seems to
play an equal role in both classes of cases. It is not clear, however,
precisely just what that role is, or whether it is exclusive.
Instead of adopting contractualism as a firm basis of decision-the
regime of offer and acceptance, the requirement of a consideration, and
the ordinary rules of contract interpretation-the Board has experimented
with a considerable variety of concepts. In some of the cases, the Board
speaks of the "bargaining away" rather than the "waiver" of the union's
rights. "Bargaining away" seems to carry with it at least some aura of
contractualism but this is more apparent than real, for what is meant when
this locution is employed is not that the union has bargained away
some demand, such as a demand for higher wages, or vacations with
pay, or fringe benefits but that it has bargained away the right to
bargain itself. Since the right to bargain is a statutory rather than a
contract right, what has been bargained away is a right under the
statute.82 However, in two cases the concept of waiver did not constitute
the ground of decision at all, although the matters in issue were not
expressly covered by the contracts themselves.3 3 There are also two cases,
32 There seems to be only one case in which this is dearly expressed. In Nash-Finch Co.,
103 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1953), in which the company had unilaterally terminated certain fringe
benefits, the Board found that the union had agreed that it was to be free of any con-
tractual obligation to maintain these benefits but held nevertheless that it was not free to
alter the benefits without consulting the union, despite rejection in the negotiations of a
Maintenance of Standards clause proposed by the union. The Board declared that "the
Union's signing of this contract did not constitute a waiver of its statutory right that
Respondent bargain with it regarding any change in these conditions of work." Id. at 1697.
In NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954), the court declined to enforce
the Board's order on the ground that it had departed from the terms of the contract, which
was intended to cover completely the obligations of the parties.. "The respondent, we think,"
declared the court, "may not be convicted of an unfair labor practice for doing no more
and no less for its union employees than its collective-bargaining agreement with them
called for." Id. at 627. A puzzling aspect of the history of this case is that in Speidel the
Board not only seems to accept the court's decision but to quote what it said with evident
approval, despite its seeming inconsistency with the rationale of Tidewater and Jacobs. Since
the benefits were not expressly covered by the terms of the written contract, it would seem
that under the doctrine of these cases they were at least bargainable.
33 These two cases are NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952), and
Avco Mfg. Corp., supra note 31, in which the Board upheld the refusal of the employer to
furnish merit increase data not necessary to the determination of an individual grievance
solely on the ground that it was not required by the contract, although the contract itself
did not expressly cover the demand for the information. Thus the Board declared:
The additional data which the union demanded had no significance whatsover in
rating an employee under the agreed system. Indeed, to require the Respondent to
furnish such additional material in connection with these grievances would, in effect,
return the entire merit system to the bargaining table despite the Union's contractual
acceptance of the present system.
Id. at 732-33. The word waiver occurs in the Avco case only in the summary of a provision
of the agreement to the effect that it was:
[T]o constitute a settlement generally of all demands and issues subject to collective
[Vol. 51
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the International News Serv.34 case and The Berkline Corp.3 case-in
which, although there is some talk about waiver, it is really surplusage,
for the true basis of the decision in each of these two cases is that there
were agreements-written in the first case and oral in the second-that
the employer was to be exempt from furnishing the very type of in-
formation being requested by the union." However, in The Berkline
Corp. case, it would seem that although the Board majority speaks
primarily in terms of contract, it rejects the requirement which ordinarily
prevails in the law of contracts, that a waiver of any substantial con-
tract right requires a consideration to be effective, for it is declared in
this case that "although a quid pro quo may be indicative of a waiver,
it is not a prerequisite to finding a waiver."3 7 Finally, there are two
cases in which the decisions turn on the concept of equitable estoppel
rather than on the concept of waiver, although the cases could just as
readily have been disposed of in terms of the latter, as the doctrine of
estoppel itself rests on waiver."
To some extent at least the conceptual analysis to be found in any
given decision in this field depends on the form of the respondent's con-
tention. If the respondent is contending that the union "waived" its rights,
the analysis will proceed in terms of "waiver." If the respondent is con-
tending that the union is "equitably estopped" to assert its rights, the
analysis will proceed in terms of "equitable estoppel." If the respondent is
bargaining, and the waiver of the obligation to bargain concerning any matter subject
to collective bargaining whether or not referred to in the contract.
Id. at 731. During the negotiations for the contract the union had been denied the very type
of information which it subsequently sought.
34 International News Serv. Div., supra note 31.
85 Supra note 31.
36 In both cases the respondents were upheld by the Board majority in denying informa-
tion to the union, although it was claimed to be necessary for the purpose of contract
administration. In the International News Serv. case, the majority, after pointing out that
"this agreement was in fact written into the express terms of the bargaining contract the
parties executed," declared:
Where, as here, the parties have themselves decided the issue at the bargaining table,
the issue has been taken away from the Board and there is no need for it to interfere.
To hold otherwise is to encourage one party to a bargaining agreement to resort to
the Board's processes to upset the terms of a contract which the other party to the
agreement had every good reason to believe had been stabilized for a definite period.
International News Serv. Div., 113 N.L.R.B. 1067, 1071-72 (1955). In The Berkline Corpora-
tion case, after finding "an effective oral waiver by the Union," the Board majority go on
to declare: "Here the union, having agreed that Respondent need not codify its rules, may
not, at its own option, disavow such agreement at some future date, still within the waiver's
term, because it has become dissatisfied with its bargain." The Berkline Corp., 123 NL.R.B.
685, 688 (1959).
37 Id. at 687; 56 Am. Jur. "Waiver" § 16, at 116-17 (1938); 5 Williston, Contracts,
§ 678, at 239 (Jaeger ed. 1961), where it is also said: "Waiver is a troublesome term in the
law.... It is used with different meanings and there are, therefore, necessarily conflictingjudicial statements as to its requisites."
38 See Tucker Steel Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 323 (1961); General Tel. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 311(1963). In the first of these cases the respondent won a Pyrrhic victory while in the second
the respondent went down to total defeat.
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contending that the union's demand is inconsistent with the terms of the
contract between the parties, the requirements of the contract may be
discussed at least in part.
A CALL FOR AN ExcLusIvE CONTRACTUALISM
It may seem that to quarrel with the choice of terminology is to lose
oneself in semantics. Actually, the choices go much deeper, and affect
the result that is reached in any given case. Psychologically, the parties
when engaged in bargaining are never thinking in terms of waiver or
equitable estoppel; they are engaged in hammering out the terms of a
bargain, and have no thought about the relinquishment or forfeiture of
known rights; and the Board's reinterpretation of what they said and
did in negotiating with each other in terms of waiver distorts their true
intentions. The process of reinterpretation proceeds, moreover, on the
basis of standards which would not obtain in the construction of ordinary
contracts. To refuse to find a waiver unless the proof is "clear and un-
mistakable" is to put upon the party seeking to establish a waiver a
far heavier burden than he would have to meet to prove the making of
an ordinary contract. In the flight from contract the realities are left
far behind.
Although this flight was preordained by the doctrine of Tidewater and
Jacobs that bargaining is precluded only with respect to those subject
matters that are covered in the written contract, it takes place even when
not required, strictly, by the demands of the doctrine. In most of the
cases-if not in almost all of them-in which the employer has taken
unilateral action and in which a waiver has been found, the decision
actually has had a simple basis, although this basis seems never to have
been clearly articulated. This basis appears to have been that the
written contract itself, properly interpreted, required the recognition of
the prerogative of management to deal with the subject matter unilater-
ally. What obscures the basis of decision is that the subject matter
was not explicitly mentioned in the written contract but had to be de-
duced from one of its general provisions. There is the story told some-
where by Justice Holmes about the justice of the peace before whom a
suit was brought by a farmer for damage to a churn. The justice of the
peace looked in the index to his code book for the entry "churns," but,
not finding it, he gave judgment for the defendant. But this is hardly
a method of interpretation that would recommend itself to the sophis-
ticated jurist. The general language of a written contract, like the general
language of a statute, must be interpreted to give effect to the inten-
tions of the parties gathered from the circumstances that led to the
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making of the contract. As general language is always ambiguous, the
parol evidence rule is not violated by receiving evidence concerning
these circumstances. This is really what is done when a mangement
prerogative clause or a coverage clause or some other clause of a general
nature is interpreted in accordance with the intentions of the parties.
But this interpretation is none the less the interpretation of the require-
ments of a written contract. Further bargaining on the subject covered
by the written contract is, then, foreclosed not by reason of the fact that
one of the parties has waived any right but by reason of the fact that
the other is entitled to the right under the terms of the written contract,
which, because of section 8(d) of the act, cannot be reopened.
The real difficulties begin when the question arises whether an employer
may take a unilateral action on a subject matter which cannot be said
to be covered by any specific or general provision of a written contract.
He is then asserting a right which can be said to exist, if at all, only by
virtue of an oral contract. There are always greater difficulties, of course,
in proving an oral than a written contract. But, since the Taft-Hartley
Act, an oral collective-bargaining agreement would seem to be perfectly
valid.3 9 By holding in some cases that the union has "bargained away"
its right to bargain collectively on a particular subject, the Board has
really given effect to contemporaneous oral understandings, despite the
logic of Tidewater and Jacobs. It has, thus, really applied in at least a
few instances the contractualism which Chairman Herzog alone espoused
in the latter case. It has done so, however, under the far more burden-
some standard of proof involved in the waiver theory.
Nevertheless, the signs are multiplying that a change is under way,
and that the Board is moving towards contractualism even if in a round-
about way. This change has been particularly manifest in the cases
involving subcontracting of work by employers-the class of cases in
which the problems of bargaining in postcontract negotiations had be-
come particularly acute. The Board had retreated from the absolutism
39 It had been held in Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 152 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1945), and in
H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941), that the original act contemplated that
collective-bargaining agreements would be in writing, although it did not so expressly pro-
vide. However, the Taft-Hartley Act also contained the provision, now incorporated in
§ 8(d) of the act, which required the execution of a written contract only "if requested
by either party," and this provision has been held to validate, by implication, oral collective-
bargaining agreements. See Hamilton Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Molders & Foundry Workers,
193 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Scientific Nutrition Corp., 180 F.2d 447 (9th Cir.
1950); United Shoe Workers v. LeDanne Footwear, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1949).
When the Tidewater and Jacobs cases were decided, it does not seem to have been con-
sidered, however, whether the validation of oral agreements at the same time that employers
were excused from bargaining with respect to subject matters "contained in a contract"
did not require that any distinction between oral and written agreements be eliminated, so
far as collective bargaining was concerned.
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of Town & Country and of Fibreboard even before the United States
Supreme Court had cast doubt upon the doctrine of these cases in
reviewing the Fibreboard decision." The retreat had begun in Shell Oil
Co.,4 and Shell Chemical Co.,4" and has been proceeding steadily ever
since then. In the greater realism and more refined conceptualism that
mark the most recent cases the Board has refused to find employers
guilty of violations of section 8(a) (5) of the act when it appeared that
the subcontracting (1) caused no substantial detriment to the employees
in the bargaining unit who might have performed the subcontracted
work, and (2) had long been practiced with the acquiescence of the
union, so that it could not be said that the additional subcontracting
really affected the existing terms and conditions of employment. 8 In
giving great weight to this latter factor, the Board has really embraced
at least one of the major elements of contractualism, for the acquiescence
of the union has been manifested in precontract negotiations, or in the
terms, express or implied, contained in the contract which it ultimately
accepted. Particularly significant is the absence from the most recent
cases of any pursuit of that elusive concept known as "management
prerogative."4 Indeed, in one of these cases, the Westinghouse Electric,
case, the Board seems to have all but bidden goodby to the even more
treacherous concept of waiver, for it has declared in this case that "it
is wrong to assume that, in the absence of an existing contractual waiver,
it is per se an unfair labor practice in all situations for an employer to
let out unit work without consulting the unit bargaining representative. 46
Since Westinghouse involves subcontracting rather than the right to in-
formation, the decision is all the more significant. The Herzog heresy of
a decade and a half ago may yet become the orthodoxy of today and
tomorrow. Although it may be too early to declare that the theory of
waiver is dead, it has certainly been dealt a grievous blow.
40 See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
41 149 N.L.R.B. 283 (1964).
42 149 N.L.R.B. 298 (1964).
43 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Mansfield Plant), 150 N.L.R.B. No. 136 (1965); Amer-
ican Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1965); General Tube Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (1965);
Central Soya Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (1965).
44 The concept is invoked in only two of the recent cases, The Fafnir Bearing Co., 151
N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1965), and International Shoe Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (1965). In both
of these cases, however, the Board merely endorsed the Trial Examiner's Decision and pro-
vided no commentary of its own.
45 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Mansfield Plant), supra note 43.
40 Id. (Trial Examiner's Decision). [Emphasis added.]
